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Comment
LOSS OF ENJOYMENT OF LIFE AS
AN ELEMENT OF DAMAGES
The measure of damages in a personal injury action for in-
juries proximately caused by defendant's wrongful action' is that
amount which will adequately compensate plaintiff. "Adequate
compensation" is traditionally defined in terms of four essential
elements: (1) mental pain and suffering; 2 (2) loss of salary or
earnings;3 (3) the impairment of earning capacity; 4 and (4) the
reasonable cost of medical care.5  Impairment of the capacity to
enjoy life, or its absolute elimination, forms a very real injury
which may be said to flow proximately from the conduct of the
defendant. The subject of this Comment is whether loss of en-
joyment of life should be included or excluded as an element of
damages.
This element has been considered by courts in both a gen-
1. See, e.g., Lane v. Southern R.R., 192 N.C. 287, 134 S.E. 855 (1926);
Denco Bus Lines v. Hargis, 204 Okla. 339, 299 P.2d 560 (1951).
2. See, e.g., Mendoza v. Rudolf, 140 Cal. App. 2d 633, 295 P.2d 445
(1956); Sager v. Sisters of Mercy, 81 Colo. 498, 256 P. 8 (1927); Corcoran
v. McNeal, 400 Pa. 14, 161 A.2d 367 (1960).
3. See, e.g., Smith v. Corsat, 260 N.C. 92, 131 S.E.2d 894 (1963);
Brody v. Cooper, 45 R.I. 453, 124 A.2d (1924); Stubbs v. Molbergert, 108
Wash. 89, 182 P. 936 (1919).
4. See, e.g., Connolly v. Pre-Mixed Concrete Co., 49 Cal. 2d 483,
319 P.2d 343 (1957); Schiele v. Motor Feight Express, 348 Pa. 525, 36 A.2d
467 (1943); McIver v. Gloria, 140 Tex. 566, 169 S.W.2d 710 (1943).
5. See, e.g., Fitzgerald v. United States Lines, 314 U.S. 16 (1941);
McCall v. Pitcarin, 232 Iowa 867, 6 N.W.2d 415 (1942); Grinnel v. Carbide
& Carbon Chemicals Corp., 282 Mich. 509, 276 N.W. 535 (1937).
erall and a special or unique form.7 Loss of enjoyment of the
general form has been identified as that loss which is common to
men of the plaintiff's class or common experience. Taste,' smell9
and numerous recreational activities0 are examples of such com-
mon losses. The unique form has not been as readily compen-
sable as the common. Although courts do recognize the compen-
sability of unique elements of life in some instances," certain
qualities have not been recognized as elements of loss of enjoy-
ment.
12
There are three views regarding loss of enjoyment of life as an
element of damages: (1) that loss of enjoyment of life is not a
proper element of damages;'8 (2) that loss of enjoyment of life is
only an integrated factor in compensatory damages; 14 and (3) that
loss of enjoyment of life is a separate and proper element of dam-
ages. 1
6. See, e.g., Bodek v. Chicago, 279 Ill. App. 410 (1935); Daugherty v.
Erie R.R., 403 Pa. 334, 169 A.2d 549 (1961); Corcoran v. McNeal, 400 Pa.
14, 161 A.2d 367 (1960).
7. See, e.g., Hogan v. Santa Fe Trail Trans. Co., 148 Kan. 720, 85
P.2d 28 (1938); McAlliser v. Carl, 233 Md. 446, 197 A.2d 140 (1964).
8. Daugherty v. Erie R.R., 403 Pa. 334, 169 A.2d 549 (1961).
9. Corcoran v. McNeal, 400 Pa. 14, 161 A.2d 367 (1960).
10. Downie v. United States Lines Co., 359 F.2d 344, n.3 (3rd Cir.
1966) (dictum) (abilities such as dancing, bowling, swimming, or engaging
in similar recreational activities; performing of household chores; and
engaging in usual family activities have been recognized subject to
proof of their existence and loss); Kasiski v. Central Jersey Power &
Light Co., 4 N.J. Misc. 130, 132 A. 201 (Sup. Ct. 1926) (ability to enjoy
boyhood games).
11. District of Columbia v. Woodbury, 136 U.S. 450 (1890) (inability
to contribute articles to a medical journal even though previous contri-
bution to the journal was done without compensation); Greenwalt v.
Nyhius, 335 Mich. 76, 55 N.W.2d 736 (1952) (right to have one's hair dyed).12. Hogan v. Santa Fe Trail Trans. Co., 148 Kan. 720, 85 P.2d 28
(1938) (loss of ability to play a violin); McAlister v. Carl, 233 Md. 446,
197 A.2d 140 (1964) (loss of pleasure from being unable to enter a chosen
and intended profession).
13. See, e.g., Winter v. Pennsylvania R.R., 45 Del. 108, 68 A.2d 513
(1949); Columbus v. Strassner, 124 Ind. 482, 25 N.E. 65 (1890); Belleview
v. England, 118 S.W. 944 (Ky. 1909); Louisville & N. R.R. v. Logsdon, 114
Ky. 746, 71 S.W. 905 (1903); Locke v. International & G.N. R.R., 25 Tex.
Civ. App. 145, 60 S.W. 314 (1901). Contra, Power v. Augusta, 191 F. 647
(C.C.E.D. Ky. 1911). This case was decided when the federal courts
were applying the general federal law rather than following the sub-
stantive state law as later dictated in Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64
(1938). But cf. Missouri Pacific R.R. v. Handley, 341 S.W.2d 203 (Tex.
Civ. App. 1960); Galveston Electric Co. v. Briggs, 14 S.W.2d 307 (Tex.
Civ. App. 1929).
14. See, e.g,, Purdy v. Swift & Co., 34 Cal. App. 656, 94 P.2d 389
(1939); Bodek v. Chicago, 279 Ill. App. 410 (1935); Daugherty v. Erie
R.R., 403 Pa. 334, 169 A.2d 549 (1961); Paul v. Kirkendall, 1 Utah 2d 1, 261
P.2d 670 (1935); cf. Prettyman v. Topkis, 39 Del. 568, 3 A.2d 708 (1938).
15. See, e.g., Reed v. Jamieson Inv. Co., 168 Wash. 111, 10 P.2d 977
(1932), adhered on reh., 168 Wash. 119, 15 P.2d 1119 (1932); Warth v.
County Court, 71 W. Va. 184, 76 S.E. 420 (1912); Bassett v. Milwaukee
Northern Ry., 169 Wis. 152, 170 N.W. 944 (1919); Benson v. Superior Mfg.
Co., 147 Wis. 20, 132 N.W. 633 (1911); see McAlister v. Carl, 233 Md. 446,
197 A.2d 140 (1964).
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NOT A PROPER ELEMENT OF DAMAGES
There are a few jurisdictions which have not recognized loss of
enjoyment of life as an element of damages.16 The primary rea-
son for this view has been fear of speculation or conjecture by
the jury.17 Courts have manifested this fear by excluding evi-
dence proving loss of enjoyment of life," and by refusing to give
jury instructions requiring consideration of the various elements
of loss of enjoyment of life. 9
The speculative or conjectural theory for a court's refusal to
give jury instructions is based upon fear of double recovery by
the plaintiff. Plaintiff may recover for pain and suffering in addi-
tion to loss of enjoyment, that is, recoveries may overlap and re-
sult in double compensation. One court stated that if loss of en-
joyment meant diminution of plaintiff's power to earn then it was
properly included; any other connotation was not a proper ele-
ment of damages.2 °
The leading case denying compensation for loss of enjoyment
is Hogan v. Santa Fe Trail TranspoTtation Co.2' In Hogan the plain-
tiff lost her ability to play a violin due to injuries caused by the
defendant's negligence. The special verdict of the jury included
the following: "If you find for the plaintiff, how much do you al-
low ... (6) for loss of enjoyment from being unable to play the
violin? A.: $4,000.00.' '22 Relying upon speculation and remoteness
as the cornerstone of its argument, the court ruled that there was
no sound basis for the assessment of damages.
2'
Another argument for exclusion of loss of enjoyment from
instructions to the jury is that such instruction invades the jury's
16. See cases cited and discussion in note 13 supra.
17. Columbus v. Strassner, 124 Ind. at 484, 25 N.E. at 67 (1890).
The court evidenced this fear by suggesting the following queries: "What
is personal enjoyment? How are we to ascertain to what extent it is
possessed by a human being? How can its absence and the cause thereof
be demonstrated? If a person for any cause has been deprived of 'personal
enjoyment' how are we to go about adjusting his loss on a money basis?"
18. Locke v. International & G.N. R.R., 25 Tex. Civ. App. 145, 60 S.W.
314 (1901).
19. Columbus v. Strassner, 124 Ind. 482, 25 N.E. 65 (1890) (lack of
personal enjoyment); Belleview v. England, 118 S.W. 994 (Ky. 1909)
(diminution of his power to pursue the course of life he might have
otherwise done); Louisville & N. R.R. v. Logsdon, 114 Ky. 746, 71 S.W.
905 (1903) (disability to move about and enjoy life).
20. Belleview v. England, 118 S.W. 994, 995 (Ky. 1909).
21. 148 Kan. 720, 85 P.2d 28 (1938).
22. Id. at 722, 85 P.2d at 30.
23. Id.
province.24 In Pittsburgh C.C. & St. L. R.R. v. O'Conner, an in-
struction was given to the jury, "that 'the fact that the plaintiff
is deprived of the pleasure and satisfaction in life that those only
who are possessed of a sound body and full use of all its members'
might be considered by them in assessing damages .... ,,25 The
court, in holding the instruction to be erroneous, reasoned that
the requested instruction was not law but only a declaration of
experience and observation.26 The court reasoned that an in-
struction containing a conclusion of fact, as requested by the plain-
tiff, constituted an invasion of the province of the jury. Im-
plicit in their decision is that loss of enjoyment of life is not in-
cludible as a matter of law. This reasoning, however, has not
been accepted in any other jurisdiction as applicable to loss of
enjoyment instructions.
INTEGRATED VIEW
Loss of enjoyment of life has been recognized as an integrated
element of pain and suffering in many jurisdictions. 27 Because
loss of enjoyment is not separately considered, it is often difficult
to determine whether the court means to compensate loss of en-
joyment of life or pain and suffering.
2 8
Lack of clarity regarding the inclusion of loss of enjoyment as
a separate element of pain and suffering or its addition to pain
and suffering is the core of criticism of the integrated view. Dif-
ferent terminology has been employed by courts within different
jurisdictions, and even within the same jurisdiction. Corcoran
v. McNea129 illustrates the problem of lack of clarity in terminology.
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court recognized the common char-
acteristics of loss of enjoyment of life.30 The Court, however,
reasoned ". . . that loss of well-being is as much a loss as an
amputation. The inability to enjoy what one has heretofore
keenly appreciated is a pain which can be equated with a positive
hurt .. ."31 The equation with pain and suffering provides a
rationale by which skeptical courts could accept loss of enjoyment
of life as an element of damages. Yet, reconciliation of Corcoran
with Scott Township v. Montgomery, 2 which held that the jury
should allow for privation and inconvenience as well as pain and
24. Pittsburgh C.C. & St. L. R.R. v. O'Conner, 171 Ind. 686, 85 N.E.
969 (1908).
25. Id. at 694, 85 N.E. at 974.
26. Id.
27. See cases cites in note 14 supra.
28. Rice v. Council Bluffs, 124 Iowa 639, 100 N.W. 506 (1904) (appar-
ent equation of pain and suffering and inconvenience or loss or burden).
29. 400 Pa. 14, 161 A.2d 367 (1960).
30. Id. (senses of taste and smell were recognized in loss of en-
joyment).
31. Id. at 23, 161 A.2d at 372 (emphasis added).
32. 95 Pa. 444 (1880).
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suffering, may be difficult. Reconciliation depends on the mean-
ing of "inconvenience." Since inconvenience is considered apart
from pain and suffering in Scott, it would appear that the cases
are irreconciliable if not confusing.33
The integrated view is unique because all the decisions have
arisen in the review of excess damage verdicts and not in review
of jury instructions.3 4 In reviewing a case concerning an alleged
excess verdict, it is the duty of the appellate court to consider the
evidence most favorable to the plaintiff.35 The measure of dam-
ages, however, is for the jury to determine. Most jurisdictions
avoid the issue of whether loss of enjoyment should be considered
and merely hold that the verdict is not excessive. Since the jury
may have considered loss of enjoyment in making its award, the
court is reluctant to alter their decision. 6 In very few instances
33. Indiana has considered the "loss of enjoyment of life" issue more
times than any other jurisdiction. The result leads in two different
directions. In its first impression, the court found erroneous an instruction
to the jury in which they might consider any "lack of personal enjoy-
ment" due to the injury on the basis of its being too speculative.
Columbus v. Strassner, 124 Ind. 482, 25 N.E. 65 (1890). In 1894 and 1906
the appellate court seemed to disregard the earlier ruling of the supreme
court and held permissible instructions which would allow for consider-
ation of the fact "that he is deprived of pleasure and satisfaction in life
that those only can enjoy who are possessed of a sound body, and a free
use of all its members." American Strawbroad v. Foust, 12 Ind. App. 421,
39 N.E. 891 (1894); see Pittsburgh C.C. & St. L. R.R. v. Cozatt, 39 Ind. App.
682, 79 N.E. 534 (1906). The supreme court later disapproved similar
instructions without referring to earlier contrary appellate cases. Pittsburgh
C.C. & St. L. R.R. v. O'Conner, 171 Ind. 686, 85 N.E. 969 (1908).
A few years later these previous appellate court cases were expressly
overruled by the appellate court itself in following the Columbus reason-
ing. South Bend Brick Co. v. Goller, 46 Ind. App. 531, 93 N.E. 37 (1910).
The law appeared settled but in review of an excess damages award the
court held that the jury could take into consideration personal suffering
and the fact that he had been deprived of most of the privileges and
enjoyments common to men of his class. Chicago I. & L. Ry. v. Stierwalt,
87 Ind. App. 478, 153 N.E. 807 (1926) ; cert. denied, 278 U.S. 633.
This position was later reiterated in Samuel E. Pentecost Const. Co.
v. O'Donnell, 112 Ind. App. 47, 39 N.E.2d 812 (1942). This view has
apparently continued in similar cases for loss of enjoyment common to a
class. King's Indiana Billiard Co. v. Winters, 123 Ind. App. 110, 106 N.E.2d
713 (1952); see Dallas & Mavis Forwarding Co. v. Liddell, 126 Ind. App.
113, 126 N.E.2d 18 (1955); trans. den., 234 Ind. 652, 130 N.E.2d 459 (court
said in dictum the jury may consider the disability to perform ordinary
pursuits of life).
Thus two dichotomous positions are maintained: Loss of enjoyment
common to a class may be considered by the jury, but an instruction in-
cluding loss of enjoyment would be clearly erroneous.
34. See cases cited note 14 supra.
35. Honeycutt v. Wabash R.R., 337 S.W.2d 50 (Mo. 1960).
36. See cases cited note 14 supra.
have verdicts been sent back for remittitur or a new trial when loss
of enjoyment might have been considered. 7 The situation is, there-
fore, unfortunately onesided. If the jury appears to have compen-
sated plaintiff for loss of enjoyment of life together with pain and
suffering, an unexcessive amount will be permitted to stand. How-
ever, if the jury apparently has not considered loss of enjoyment,
plaintiff's only recourse would be either additur or a new trial.
If the jury cannot be given thorough instructions to consider loss
of enjoyment of life as an element of damages, then any favor-
able effect of a new trial is questionable. To say that loss of enjoy-
ment might have been considered is not assurance that it was con-
sidered by the jury in making their award.
SEPARATE AND PROPER ELEMENT
A third view considers loss of enjoyment of life as a separate
and proper element of damages. This theory has been adopted in
a few jurisdictions. In expressly authorizing loss of capacity to
enjoy life as an element of damages, the West Virginia Supreme
Court in Nees v. Julian Goldman Stores, Inc. 9 stated that their
chief concern was that the instruction did not inform the jury of
the elements to be considered.
In McAlister v. Carl,40 the Maryland Court of Appeals held
instructions allowing the jury to compensate the plaintiff for re-
linquishment of her chosen and intended occupation to be errone-
ous. Evidence of definite plans and commitments for the teaching
of physical education was lacking. Although plaintiff had gradu-
ated from a recognized college, she had not instituted contract
negotiations by September, three months after the accident and
before she had knowledge that the accident would force her into a
more sedentary occupation. The decision does not appear to be
repugnant to the issue of whether loss of enjoyment of life is a
separate element of damages. In fact, the case appears to support
recognition of the element subject to a standard of adequate proof.
In the absence of such evidence the court found the plaintiff's claim
to be insufficient. There was, however, dicta to the effect that had
there been adequate proof the claim would have been compen-
sable.
Loss of enjoyment of life has also been allowed apart from
pain and suffering in appellate review of alleged excess damage
verdicts. 41 At least one court has allowed "impairment of ability
37. Ironically, there is a dearth of cases on the question of whether
loss of enjoyment of life would be includible as a compensable element
in review of a verdict for alleged inadequate damages.
38. See cases cited note 15 supra.
39. 109 W. Va. at 336, 154 S.E. at 774 (1930).
40. 233 Md. 446, 197 A.2d 140 (1964).
41. Kasiski v. Central Jersey Power & Light Co., 4 N.J. Misc. 130,
132 A. 201 (Sup. Ct. 1926).
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to enter and enjoy those boyhood games and pastimes" as an
element.4 2 The case affords, however, no assurance that the jury
will be informed that they should consider this element. Where
the jurisdiction allows loss of enjoyment as a separate element
there is little reason why an instruction should be disallowed.
CONCLUSION
Of the three views on loss of enjoyment of life, the theory
which does not consider it to be a proper element is the least
acceptable in justice and logic. Generally, refusal to allow com-
pensation for loss of enjoyment is based upon either of two prem-
ises: (1) that loss of enjoyment has no basic value; or (2) that
value for this element is so uncertain and indefinite that it is
immeasurable without conjecture.
The first premise is weak because the value of loss of life and
the enjoyment of it have been generally recognized. However,
lack of a proper standard to measure loss of enjoyment or specu-
lation poses a more formidable objection. Nevertheless, mere dif-
ficulty in achieving accurate measurement of damages to be
awarded should not preclude it as an element of damages.43 Fears
of conjecture, speculation, and double recovery were present in
the early considerations of whether there should be recovery for
mental pain, fright, and humiliation. 44 Where there is no legal
measure of damages, the law leaves the function of allocating an
amount to the discretion of the jury.45 The effect of a rule which
would disallow damages for loss of enjoyment of life would seem
repugnant to the basic value of life itself. Evaluation of loss of
enjoyment of life should be a jury question determined in a
manner similar to the evaluation of mental pain. The jury should
be instructed as to which elements to consider; the weight of the
evidence proving loss of such elements is for their consideration in
determining the amount.
The integrated theory of loss of enjoyment is a less objection-
able view. Nevertheless, its equation with or inclusion as part of
pain and suffering has presented at least one objectionable prob-
lem-lack of clarity as to which element is being compensated.
Moreover, as an integrated factor, loss of enjoyment may not be
considered by the jury. If value is given to the enjoyment of life,
42. Id.
43. Hogan v. Santa Fe Trail Trans. Co., 148 Kan. at 728, 85 P.2d at 34
(1938) (dissenting opinion).
44. Id. at 729, 85 P.2d at 35.
45. Gibbard v. Evans, 87 W. Va. 650, 106 S.E. 37 (1921).
its loss recognized, and evidence is received in proof thereof, then
an instruction to the jury concerning the elements they might
consider is in order.
The best view appears to be that which supports loss of en-
joyment of life as a separate element of damages. The trier of fact
could employ a method similar to that presently utilized in the
measurement of mental pain to arrive at a reasonable measure
of damages for loss of enjoyment. By allowing instructions re-
garding the loss of enjoyment, confusion could be avoided. The
award would then represent an amount reflecting the jury's con-
sideration. An appellate court's later justification of an amount
by resorting to an unsubstantiated assumption that the jury may
have considered the loss is not an acceptable result. The argument
that this process would lead to an undue and unreasonable classifi-
cation of elements of damages is weak. The only classification re-
quired to aid the court is the general-special dichotomy. Both
general and special forms should be subject to proof regarding their
former presence and subsequent absence. Of course, the verdict of
the jury and the decision of the court must rest upon substantial
evidence and not mere allegation.
RONALD J. MISHKIX
